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In Wal-Mart v. Dukes1 and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion,2 the 
Supreme Court revamped the law concerning the Federal Arbitration 
Act3 and Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,4 allowing 
businesses to insulate themselves from class action suits by employees 
and consumers. In Wal-Mart, the Court held that under Rule 23, a 
class action case for intentional employment discrimination could not 
proceed when the allegedly discriminatory decisions were made by 
individual supervisors at different stores.5 The Court’s majority 
rejected the lower courts’ determination that Wal-Mart’s nationally 
uniform personnel policies could be challenged on a class basis, 
instead holding that the discrimination was the result of individual 
supervisors’ exercise of discretion and needed to be proven on an 
individual basis.6 In AT&T, the Court further limited class actions by 
upholding the ability of companies to include waivers of the right to 
proceed as a class action in a form arbitration agreement.7 
Each decision has significant implications within its field 
(employment discrimination law and consumer law, respectively). 
Together, the two decisions allow companies to opt out of class action 
liability through contract and make it more difficult to bring class 
actions against corporations that do not use such contracts. 
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 1.  131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 
 2.  131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
 3.  9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2011). 
 4.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 5.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 6.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 612 (9th Cir. 2010); Dukes v. Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 153 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 7.  AT&T, 131 S. Ct. at 1752–53. 
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Collectively, they reflect the belief of the five conservative Justices in 
the majority that companies must be protected from litigation that is 
large simply because companies are large. Rarely has the Court been 
more explicit in its desire to protect big business than in its statement 
in AT&T that corporations need to be protected from the “in 
terrorem” effect of class actions resulting in settlement of even non-
meritorious suits.8 Implicitly, the conservative majority indicated that 
courts cannot be trusted to manage large litigation, even if it means 
that the state and federal laws protecting consumers and employees 
will go unenforced. 
Big companies, like Wal-Mart and AT&T Mobility, that deal with 
thousands or millions of consumers and employees enjoy certain 
strategic advantages because of their size. Similarly, class actions pose 
certain strategic advantages because of their size. The current Court 
majority has used its power to protect companies from big litigation. 
In so doing, the Court has abdicated its responsibility to interpret 
federal laws on employment, arbitration, and class actions consistently 
with Congress’s intent to balance the interests of employees and 
consumers with those of large corporations. 
This article has three main parts. Part I discusses the importance 
of class action suits in ensuring redress when numerous individuals 
suffer relatively small injuries. Part II examines what Wal-Mart likely 
will mean for future employment discrimination class actions. Finally, 
Part III focuses on AT&T and its likely impact on class actions 
involving arbitration clauses. Our central point is that although the 
cases arise in different contexts and involve different legal issues, they 
must be read together because both are premised on the same desire 
to protect big business from class action suits and because together 
they substantially limit the ability of consumers and employees to use 
the class action to remedy illegal corporate actions. 
I.  CLASS ACTIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF AGGREGATE HARMS 
With the rise of the large business corporation in the early 
twentieth century, courts and legislatures developed the class action as 
a procedural device to protect individuals from exploitation by large 
entities.9 Courts and legislatures realized that large entities have 
 
 8.  Id. at 1752. 
 9.  Robert G. Bone, Personal and Impersonal Litigative Forms: Reconceiving the History 
of Adjudicative Representation, 70 B.U. L. REV. 213, 222–26 (1990). See generally STEPHEN C. 
YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS ACTION (1987) 
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incentives to engage in widespread but small violations of law because 
their lawyers know that most people cannot afford to sue over a small 
transgression.10 When individual litigation is not economically 
rational, the threat of suit is not an effective deterrent to illegal 
behavior. Reliance on enforcement by government agencies is not an 
adequate substitute for private litigation, as even dedicated and 
aggressive government agencies, such as the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Commission or state departments of labor or consumer 
protection, do not have the staff or financial resources to handle 
millions of small individual claims.11 Absent a robust bureaucracy 
dedicated to effectuating the consumer and employee protection laws, 
class actions are an essential aspect of law enforcement. 
Large entities, including employers and sellers of consumer goods 
and services, face both costs and benefits as a result of the market 
power that comes from being large. First, large entities have access to 
legal expertise and have market power to use that expertise to craft 
company-favorable standardized terms on which to contract with 
employees and consumers (including arbitration agreements or forum 
selection clauses, choice-of-law provisions, and limitations on 
warranties). Second, large entities benefit from economies of scale. A 
company has every reason to think and act in the aggregate—
squeezing a few extra cents of profit from each of its millions of 
consumers and employees (including by legally questionable 
methods) hurts each individual slightly but benefits the company 
hugely. Thus, if the company wants to sell mobile phone service 
contracts by giving away phones but does not want to pay the sales 
tax, it will say the phones are free when in fact it is shifting the thirty 
dollar sales tax to consumers, knowing that it will save millions of 
dollars across tens of thousands of individuals. Similarly, if a company 
adopts personnel policies that result in employees being paid a few 
cents less per hour than required by law, in the aggregate it will save 
 
(describing the history of class actions).  
 10.  On the purpose of the class action, see generally 7A WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE & 
MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1751 (3d ed. 2005). Sophisticated accounts of 
the role of large-scale class actions in contemporary law include William B. Rubenstein, A 
Transactional Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371 (2001); David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: 
The Class As Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913 (1998). 
 11.  As Chief Justice Burger stated, “[t]he aggregation of individual claims in the context of 
a classwide suit is an evolutionary response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the 
regulatory action of government.” Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980). 
An example of a government agency calling for private class action as a supplement to 
insufficient government enforcement resources is described infra text accompanying note 103. 
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millions of dollars in labor costs. 
Even if it is illegal to fail to disclose the full cost of the sales 
gimmick or to misclassify an employee as ineligible for overtime, most 
consumers and employees will not sue for three reasons. First, most 
do not know it is illegal, and even those who suspect it is illegal will 
not bother to find and consult a lawyer because it is stressful and 
time-consuming. Second, most employees will not sue their current 
employer for fear of retaliation. And third, assuming they pass those 
obstacles, no lawyer will take a case worth $30 or $300 or even $3,000. 
A company may thus find it economically rational to cheat a 
consumer or employee. In short, large corporations have the market 
power and legal expertise to shade the law to their benefit, and they 
have the incentive to do it in a million small transactions that add up 
to big profits. 
The risk, of course, that comes with size and uniformity of contract 
relations is that when employees and consumers discover that they 
have all been the victims of a similar wrongful practice they will hire a 
lawyer to file a class action alleging that the practice is illegal. 
Damages in a class action can be substantial, and the larger the 
company, the greater the damages. 
Just as the bigness of the aggregated profits from illegalities in 
millions of small transactions tempts some companies, so too does the 
bigness of class action damages tempt some lawyers. Some will file a 
suit for the settlement value rather than to obtain meaningful relief 
for every class member. Even those lawyers determined to recover 
relief to benefit every member of the plaintiff class know that class 
actions are sufficiently large and expensive to litigate that it may be in 
the company’s interest to settle rather than to try to win it all. The 
reality is that a consumer class action typically yields relatively little 
for each consumer; after all, each member of the AT&T class lost only 
$30.22 to begin with, and a successful class action will return only a 
fraction of the original loss. Comparatively, the plaintiffs’ lawyers’ fees 
are substantial. The image of lawyers being greatly enriched while 
consumers get relatively little makes class actions an easy target for 
political opponents. If, however, such class actions are conceptualized 
as being about enforcing the law and deterring future wrongdoing, 
then the lawyers are being fairly rewarded for protecting consumers 
and preventing violations. 
Large class actions have drawn criticism from conservative courts 
and commentators that tend to worry more about the harms of large 
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class actions to companies than the harms those companies can inflict 
on consumers and employees.12 Progressive courts and commentators, 
by contrast, tend to worry more about the harms of large companies’ 
policies on consumers and employees than on the harms that class 
actions can impose on companies.13 The weight of scholarly opinion 
strikes a middle ground, focusing on preserving the deterrent effects 
of class actions to curb the incentives of large companies to act 
improperly, while reforming the treatment of settlement class actions 
to reduce the incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to act improperly.14 But 
in Wal-Mart and AT&T the Supreme Court abandoned any pretense 
of equilibration and handed large companies huge victories. The 
significance, of course, is not simply that Wal-Mart’s employees who 
suffered sex discrimination are unlikely ever to recover damages or 
that AT&T has been unjustly enriched by millions of dollars. The 
larger concern is that big companies know that it will be much harder 
to sue them in class actions, and the unscrupulous ones will more 
often make the choice to enrich themselves at the expense of 
consumers and employees. 
II.  WAL-MART V. DUKES: AGGREGATE HARMS  
AND EMPLOYMENT CLASS ACTIONS 
Wal-Mart offered the Court a choice about whether to allow class 
actions that challenge the discriminatory employment practices of 
huge companies. The evidence showed that Wal-Mart allowed 
supervisors to set pay within a range of about two dollars per hour 
and that supervisors nationwide exercised their discretion to pay 
women less than similarly situated men.15 The evidence also showed 
 
 12.  E.g. Louis W. Hensler III, Class Counsel, Self-Interest and Other People’s Money, 35 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 53, 54 (2004); James P. Feeney & Richard E. Gottlieb, Taming Class Actions: 
Keeping Best Practices in Mind, RISK MGMT. MAG., Feb. 2005, at 10. 
 13.  E.g. Jay M. Feinman, Incentives for Litigation or Settlement in Large Tort Cases: 
Responding to Insurance Company Intransigence, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 189, 193 
(2008); Melissa Hart, Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. 
REV. 813, 835 (2004). 
 14.  The scholarship on class actions is so voluminous that it is perhaps unwise to hazard 
any statement about the weight of the authority. Readers interested in the debates over the use 
and abuse of class actions might consult 7A WRIGHT, MILLER, KANE & MARCUS, supra note 10 
§ 1754 (noting empirical studies showing that some criticisms of class actions were overblown in 
that they were based on a few unrepresentative cases rather than the mass of class actions in 
courts across the country) and § 1797.2 (on the advantages and disadvantages of settlement class 
actions and the efforts to reform Rule 23 to minimize the disadvantages while retaining the 
advantages). 
 15.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 146–49 (N.D. Cal. 2004). Women were 
paid less than men in every region, compensation disparities existed in the majority of job 
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that Wal-Mart gave store managers discretion about which employees 
to promote, and promotions were often the result of a supervisor 
tapping an employee rather than a uniform process equally urging all 
employees to apply.16 In the aggregate, controlling for all other factors, 
men were promoted more than women.17 In some cases, men were 
promoted over women with better credentials and stronger personnel 
records.18 Quite importantly, the procedural posture of the case 
(review of class certification prior to discovery or trial) meant that the 
Court majority was not charged with finding the existence of this 
discriminatory pattern; the issue was solely whether a class action 
could be brought to challenge it. 
Because, in the aggregate, supervisors setting pay for Wal-Mart’s 
women employees chose a number at the low end of the permissible 
range, Wal-Mart gained huge labor cost savings at the expense of 
millions of women. But individual cases of wage discrimination are 
expensive to bring, and the gendered pay differential (say, between 
$10 and $10.50 per hour) for each employee over the statutory 
limitations period is only a few thousand dollars—not enough to 
justify the costs of suit. Similarly, it is expensive to litigate an 
individual discriminatory-promotion decision, and the backpay 
awards (the difference between what the plaintiff earned at the lower-
level job and what she would have earned if she had properly been 
promoted) are often too low to justify suit. As such, if the 1.5 million 
women employed by the nation’s largest employer have suffered 
unlawful discrimination in pay and promotions, in the aggregate, Wal-
Mart has saved millions of dollars in labor costs by violating Title VII. 
But without a class action, it is not economically rational for Wal-Mart 
employees to risk their jobs and happiness to file a lawsuit or for 
hundreds of plaintiffs’ lawyers to take these cases. This is the classic 
situation where a large corporation can benefit tremendously from 
illegal activity and where only a class action is likely to provide a 
meaningful deterrent or remedy. 
 
 
categories, and as time passed, women earned less than the male coworkers who were hired at 
the same time. Id. at 155. In total, women earned between five and fifteen percent less than 
similarly situated men every year of the class period. Id. at 156. 
 16.  Id. at 148–49. 
 17.  Id. at 160–61. On average, women had to wait 1.52 years longer than men to be 
promoted to assistant manager, and 1.48 years longer than men to be promoted to store 
manager. Id. at 161. 
 18.  Id. 
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The Wal-Mart majority opinion is stunning in its activism and 
impact on numerous features of employment discrimination and class 
actions. First, it increased the difficulty of proving a common question 
of law or fact under Rule 23(a) by requiring “significant proof” to 
which the trial court must extend a “rigorous analysis.”19 This 
essentially will require a determination of the merits at the time of 
class certification. Second, it redefined the common issue of law or 
fact under Rule 23(a)(2) to demand a higher level of specificity than 
previously required.20 Third, it rejected the social framework analysis, 
a dominant contemporary social science approach to understanding 
how employment practices of corporations operate, as a legitimate 
method of proving discrimination.21 In the process, the Court 
suggested that the Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.22 
standard for introduction of scientific proof at trial also will apply at 
the class certification stage of the litigation, which will greatly increase 
the complexity of class certification determinations and again make 
the decision of whether to allow a class action essentially a 
determination of the merits.23 Fourth, it suggested that a company-
wide policy of allowing discretion resulting in statistical pay and 
promotion disparities cannot be challenged under the disparate 
treatment framework.24 Fifth, it treated a company’s announced policy 
prohibiting unlawful discrimination as significant evidence that the 
company is not in fact discriminating.25 Sixth, it held that company-
 
 19.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551–53 (2011). Cf. Wolin v. Jaguar 
Land Rover N. Am., LLC, 617 F.3d 1168, 1172 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Commonality exists where class 
members’ ‘situations share a common issue of law or fact, and are sufficiently parallel to insure 
a vigorous and full presentation of all claims for relief.’” (quoting Cal. Rural Legal Assistance, 
Inc. v. Legal Servs. Corp., 917 F.2d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 1990))). 
 20.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2541, 2550–52. Cf. Wolin, 617 F.3d at 1172 (“‘The existence of 
shared legal issues with divergent factual predicates is sufficient, as is a common core of salient 
facts coupled with disparate legal remedies within the class.’” (quoting Hanlon v. Chrysler 
Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998))).  
 21.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2543–54. Cf. Tuli v. Brigham & Women’s Hosp., Inc., 592 F. 
Supp. 2d 208, 214–16 (D. Mass. 2009) (admitting the testimony of a psychologist with expertise 
in social framework analysis to prove workplace discrimination). 
 22.  509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
 23.  See Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
 24.  Id. at 2555–56. Cf. Emanuel v. Marsh, 897 F.2d 1435, 1439 (8th Cir. 1990) (allowing an 
employee to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact by proving statistical disparities 
within the workplace and a causal connection between these disparities and the use of subjective 
performance awards). 
 25.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2541, 2545. Cf. Ridley v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 217 F. App’x 
130, 138 (3d Cir. 2007) (affirming denial of employer’s motion for judgment as a matter of law, 
despite the fact that it “maintained policies against discrimination and harassment and an Open 
Door policy for reporting complaints of discrimination or harassment”). 
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wide statistical evidence, including regression analyses showing that 
pay and promotion disparities were caused by gender, was insufficient 
to show class-wide discrimination. Plaintiffs would need to provide 
evidence showing gender disparities at each individual unit based on 
the managers whose decisions were the cause of the disparity.26 
Seventh, it held that to certify a class, plaintiffs must present 
anecdotal evidence of discrimination by a significant but undefined 
number of allegedly discriminatory decision-makers.27 Eighth, it held 
that a suit seeking backpay under Title VII and, more broadly, a suit 
seeking monetary relief in general, cannot be certified under Rule 
23(b)(2).28 Finally, and somewhat enigmatically, it stated that the 
Rules Enabling Act prohibits Congress from amending Rule 23 to 
allow certification of a class in any fashion that would deprive the 
defendant of the opportunity to prove statutory defenses to individual 
claims,29 although precisely what this means for the future of class 
action litigation is uncertain. 
Each of these nine holdings or statements reflects a potentially 
significant change in the law; many are a rejection of decades of 
judicial precedent or respected scholarly argument about 
employment discrimination and class actions. Although each merits a 
law-review length analysis of its own, this article proceeds more 
narrowly.30 We examine the implications of the portion of the Court’s 
 
 26.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2555. Cf. Conti v. Am. Axle & Mfg., 326 F. App’x 900, 909 (6th 
Cir. 2009) (reversing summary judgment for defendant-corporation when plaintiff-employee 
offered “statistical evidence showing that [the corporation] ha[d] never had a female executive 
director or vice president, and that only a small percentage of its executives, all at the lowest 
salary bands, [were] female”). 
 27.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2556. Cf. Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 
608, 613 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming judgment for plaintiffs when they “presented anecdotal 
evidence of specific instances of discriminatory policies and practices,” making no mention of 
requiring evidence of a significant number of discriminatory decision-makers). 
 28.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2557. Cf. In re Monumental Life Ins. Co., 365 F.3d 408, 418 (5th 
Cir. 2004) (holding that “[e]quitable monetary relief is compatible with a rule 23(b)(2) class” 
and that such a rule is “limited to the context of title VII backpay, a remedy designated by 
statute as ‘equitable’”). 
 29.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. 
 30.  Wal-Mart has generated a mountain of scholarly commentary in the years it spent 
wending its way through the federal courts. See, e.g., Kathryn Smith, Comment, What Do 1.5 
Million Wal-Mart Women Have in Common?: Dukes v. Wal-Mart Class Action Certification, 52 
B.C. L. REV. E. SUPP. 149 (2011), http://www.bc.edu/bclr/esupp_2011/12_smith.pdf; Lesley 
Wexler, Wal-Mart Matters, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 95 (2011); Bejan D. Fanibanda, Dukes v. 
Wal-Mart: The Expansion of Class Certification as a Mechanism for Reconciling Employee 
Conflicts, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 591 (2007); Melissa Hart, Learning from Wal-Mart, 
10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 355 (2006); Aaron B. Lauchheimer, Note, A Classless Act: The 
Ninth Circuit’s Erroneous Class Certification in Dukes v. Wal-Mart, Inc., 71 BROOK. L. REV. 519 
(2005); Brad Seligman, Patriarchy at the Check-Out Counter: The Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
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ruling that increases the difficulty of challenging patterns of 
discrimination under Rule 23(a), which provides that a class action 
may be brought only when the class shares a common question of law 
or fact.31 
A.  The Court’s New Rules for Employment Discrimination Class 
Actions 
Rule 23(a) requires that a court find four elements to certify a 
class action: (1) that the class is “so numerous that joinder of all 
members is impracticable”; (2) that “there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class”; (3) that the claims or defenses of the class 
representative are “typical of” those of the class; and (4) that the 
representative “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class.”32 Traditionally, all that has been required for commonality is 
some issue of law or fact that is shared among the members of the 
class; distinct issues can then be tried separately.33 The trial court 
found a number of common issues. First, it found that Wal-Mart had 
“company-wide corporate practices and policies, which include[d] (a) 
excessive subjectivity in personnel decisions, (b) gender stereotyping, 
and (c) maintenance of a strong corporate culture.”34 Second, it found 
that Wal-Mart had company-wide gender disparities in pay and 
promotions that were caused by discrimination. This finding was 
based on statistical evidence that women were paid less and promoted 
less frequently than men, even when they had better credentials or 
performance reviews.35 Third, it found company-wide gender bias 
based on anecdotal evidence from Wal-Mart stores across the country 
that supported the finding that discrimination, rather than the alleged 
preferences of female employees to work for less money and decline 
promotional opportunities, explained the disparities.36 The court of 
appeals, en banc, likewise held that Wal-Mart had a national corporate 
culture and general management policies that discriminated against 
women. The court rejected Wal-Mart’s argument that the company-
wide gender disparities were simply the results of individual low-level 
 
Inc. Class-Action Suit, in WAL-MART: THE FACE OF TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY CAPITALISM 231 
(Nelson Lichtenstein, ed., 2006). 
 31.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–52. 
 32.  FED. R. CIV. P. 23. 
 33.  1-14A MOORE’S MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 14A.23. 
 34.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 166 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
FINALIZED FISK (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2011  9:40 PM 
82 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SPECIAL ISSUE [VOL. 7 
managers’ decisions, each of which must be proven and litigated 
separately.37 
Ignoring the abuse of discretion standard of review normally 
applicable to class certification decisions,38 the Supreme Court 
rejected the evidence on which the lower courts relied. First, it found 
that the plaintiffs’ statistical evidence of nationwide gender disparities 
was “insufficient”39 and speculated that the pay disparities between 
men and women “may be attributable to only a small set of Wal-Mart 
stores.”40 Second, it found the plaintiffs’ expert witness not worthy of 
belief and “disregard[ed]”41 his testimony about the ways in which 
Wal-Mart’s personnel policies and corporate culture allowed gender 
bias to infect thousands of pay and promotion decisions.42 Third, it 
dismissed the 120 affidavits recounting evidence of discriminatory 
statements and decisions as insufficient given Wal-Mart’s size and the 
size of the plaintiff class. Having brushed aside the evidence of bias 
and twice pointed out that Wal-Mart has a written policy prohibiting 
sex discrimination,43 the majority found that the gender disparities 
were the result of individual supervisors’ decisions and needed to be 
litigated individually. 
Apart from the majority’s selective parsing and weighing of the 
evidence, its crucial analytic move was to define the nature of a 
common issue of law or fact much more narrowly than the lower 
courts. Early in the opinion, the Court rejected two exceedingly 
abstract characterizations of the common question issue, neither of 
which had been offered by the parties or any lower court: that all 
plaintiffs “have suffered a Title VII injury” or “a disparate impact 
Title VII injury.”44 Without discussing the merits of the intermediate 
positions (which the plaintiffs argued and on which the lower courts 
relied), the majority immediately posited an extremely narrow 
definition of commonality: that the plaintiffs’ “claims must depend 
upon a common contention—for example, the assertion of 
discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor.”45 Later in the 
 
 37.  Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 612 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 38.  1-14A MOORE’S MANUAL OF FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 14A.44.  
 39.  Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2555 (2011). 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Id. at 2554. 
 42.  Id. at 2555. 
 43.  Id. at 2545, 2553. 
 44.  Id. at 2551. 
 45.  Id. at 2545. 
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opinion, the majority framed the common question issue slightly 
differently, stating “that Wal-Mart operated under a general policy of 
discrimination,” which the majority rejected in the next sentence 
because “Wal-Mart’s announced policy forbids sex discrimination.”46 
Subsequently, the majority rejected the lower court’s finding that 
common issues of law and fact were presented by Wal-Mart’s strong 
corporate control regarding employment and its nationwide 
corporate culture, which led individual supervisors to pay women less 
and to prefer men for promotion. The majority speculated that 
individual supervisors might have exercised their discretion 
differently.47 Elsewhere, the majority invented an alternate theory of 
the common question issue: plaintiffs must establish “a uniform, store-
by-store disparity” to show a common issue, and statistical evidence of 
regional and national disparities did not suffice.48 In the next 
paragraph, the majority concluded that, because the plaintiffs “have 
identified ‘no specific employment practice’” that caused the gender 
disparity in pay and promotions, there was no common question of 
law or fact.49 As the majority put it, “the crucial question” in any 
discrimination case is “why was I disfavored,” which the majority 
imagined as an individualized decision provable only by evidence of 
individual supervisors’ motives.50 
B.  The Problems with the New Rules 
The Court’s analysis was flawed on four important levels. First, by 
focusing on the existence of a “specific employment practice,” the 
Court conflated the disparate impact analysis (which requires proof 
of an employment practice having a discriminatory impact) and 
disparate treatment analysis (which does not).51 Second, the Court 
failed to appreciate that it was not a coincidence that throughout the 
country, Wal-Mart’s women employees were subject to discrimination 
in pay and promotion; the Court ignored or did not believe all of the 
evidence indicating that decisions by individual managers were 
influenced by a common corporate culture. Third, the Court failed to 
 
 46.  Id. at 2553. 
 47.  Id. at 2555. 
 48.  Id.  
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. at 2552. 
 51.  Aida M. Alaka, Corporate Reorganizations, Job Layoffs, and Age Discrimination: Has 
Smith v. City of Jackson Substantially Expanded the Rights of Older Workers Under the 
ADEA?, 70 ALB. L. REV. 143, 148–51 (2006). 
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recognize the importance of the class action in providing a remedy 
and deterrent against future discrimination by large corporations, 
where, for a host of reasons, it is unlikely that individual women will 
bring lawsuits. Fourth, the Court essentially ignored the standard of 
review. As mentioned above, class certification decisions are reviewed 
on appeal under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. In his 
majority opinion, Justice Scalia substituted his own findings of fact, 
granted no deference to the lower courts, and effectively engaged in a 
de novo review. 
The essence of the majority’s reasoning is obscured by the 
meandering path of the opinion. Laid bare, the reasoning depends on 
two debatable factual assumptions about the nature and prevalence 
of employment discrimination in large organizations. First, Justice 
Scalia said that, “left to their own devices, most managers in any 
corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids 
sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based 
criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity 
at all.”52 Second, “[i]n a company of Wal-Mart’s size and geographical 
scope, it is quite unbelievable that all managers would exercise their 
discretion in a common way without some common direction.”53 Both 
of these are factual findings that the Court has no business making. 
Decades of employment discrimination law are premised on contrary 
assumptions, such as the idea that a pattern of inequality may be the 
result of discrimination rather than preferences of women or people 
of color to be paid less and forgo promotion. From these two factual 
assumptions, the majority reached the conclusion that unless there is 
an explicitly discriminatory policy, plaintiffs must prove individual 
managers’ reasons for setting their pay or choosing which employees 
to promote. 
Because the overwhelming majority of companies now have 
formal policies that prohibit discrimination, the result is plain: class 
action intentional employment discrimination cases will be very 
difficult to bring. If there is a small workplace where one or two 
people make the hiring, promotion, and pay decisions, it will not have 
the numerosity required for a class action. But if there is a large 
workplace where many people make the employment decisions, the 
Court said that there is not the commonality required for a class 
 
 52.  Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2554. 
 53.  Id. at 2555. 
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action. It is hard to imagine the Goldilocks situation where the 
corporation has just the right number of decision-makers for both 
numerosity and commonality. The opinion thus sends a clear message 
to big businesses that they do not need to worry about employment 
discrimination class actions of this type so long as they have an official 
policy forbidding employment discrimination. 
Because of Wal-Mart’s size and notoriety, we know a great deal 
about the effect of its corporate culture on its labor practices. As part 
of its relentless money-saving policies, store managers faced constant 
pressure to reduce labor costs. In general, regional managers turned a 
blind eye to how store managers did so.54 Individual litigation would 
predictably prove of limited effect to change this corporate culture. 
Wal-Mart would simply pay the damages and discipline the store 
manager if necessary, but nothing else would change as long as the 
aggregate cost savings from marginally legal practices were greater 
than the damages paid to an individual woman. Taking away the class 
action leaves the asymmetric incentives untouched: Wal-Mart has an 
incentive to pay women as little as possible, and individual women 
working at Wal-Mart have little incentive to sue it. 
III.  AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION: AGGREGATE HARMS AND 
CLASS ARBITRATION 
The problem of asymmetric incentives is even greater for class 
action waivers in form arbitration agreements. State supreme courts, 
state legislatures, and federal courts have attempted to protect 
employees and consumers by holding that especially onerous waivers 
and agreements are unconscionable and invalid because they 
effectively exculpate a defendant from liability.55 Corporations have 
argued that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts such 
applications of state contract law.56 In general, the question is when 
 
 54.  See NELSON LICHTENSTEIN, THE RETAIL REVOLUTION: HOW WAL-MART CREATED 
A BRAVE NEW WORLD OF BUSINESS (2009); Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2550–52; DON 
SODERQUIST, THE WAL-MART WAY: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE SUCCESS OF THE WORLD’S 
LARGEST COMPANY (2005); LIZA FEATHERSTONE, SELLING WOMEN SHORT: THE LANDMARK 
BATTLE FOR WOMEN’S RIGHTS AT WAL-MART (2004); Wal-Mart: The High Cost of Low Price 
(2005) (documentary film available online at http://topdocumentaryfilms.com/wal-mart-the-
high-cost-of-low-price/). 
 55.  See, e.g., Mansker v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 95638 n.3 (W.D. Wash. 
Sept. 14, 2010) (“[U]nder Washington law, class action waivers are substantively unconscionable 
if they operate to exculpate a defendant from liability for widespread wrongdoing.”). 
 56.  See, e.g., David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1247 (2008–2009); David S. Schwartz, Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 
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arbitration agreements merely provide alternative forums and when 
the procedural differences between arbitration and litigation amount 
to waivers of substantive rights. 
In AT&T v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court held that the FAA 
preempted the California law invalidating the class action waivers in 
form arbitration agreements.57 Vincent and Liza Concepcion 
purchased cellular telephone service from AT&T Mobility LCC 
under a form contract providing for arbitration of all disputes 
between the parties. AT&T had advertised the phones as free but 
charged the Concepcions $30.22 in taxes.58 Their suit was consolidated 
with other similar claims in a federal class action alleging that AT&T 
had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on 
phones it advertised as free. 
AT&T moved to compel individual arbitration under the terms of 
its contract with the Concepcions. The federal district court and Ninth 
Circuit rejected arbitration, finding California law made such 
contractual provisions unenforceable on the grounds that the class 
action waiver was an exculpation of AT&T because individual 
arbitration of a dispute was no substitute for a class action remedy.59 
The FAA requires enforcement of contractual arbitration clauses but 
specifies that such clauses are not enforceable where state law 
provides for revocation.60 The California law on which the lower 
courts relied was the rule stated in Discover Bank v. Superior Court,61 
in which the California Supreme Court specifically held that class 
action waivers in consumer arbitration clauses were not enforceable 
under state law.62 Discover Bank was one of a series of California 
Supreme Court decisions finding certain terms in mandatory, pre-
dispute adhesion arbitration agreements to be unconscionable or 
contrary to public policy because they exculpate corporations from 
liability under state statute or common law.63 
In Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,64 the Court held that 
the FAA makes enforceable an agreement mandating arbitration of 
 
IND. L.J. (forthcoming 2012). 
 57.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 
 58.  Id. at 1744. 
 59.  Id. at 1744–45.  
 60.  9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 1947). 
 61.  113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005). 
 62.  Id. at 1118.  
 63.  See supra text accompanying notes 56–60, 62, 64. 
 64.  500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
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statutory claims because an arbitration agreement is not a waiver of 
substantive rights, but only a submission of their resolution to “an 
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”65 Courts and legislatures have 
held that arbitration agreements that limit remedies or operate as 
waivers of substantive rights are therefore a violation of due process,66 
state substantive statutes,67 or general state contract doctrine, 
including the law of unconscionability or the law declaring contracts 
that exculpate parties to be contrary to public policy.68 But courts also 
have held that the FAA preempts state laws that restrict the 
enforceability of arbitration agreements unless the state law is a 
principle of general contract law rather than expressly about 
arbitration.69 
The issue in AT&T was whether the Discover Bank rule was a 
principle of general contract law immune from FAA preemption. A 
generally applicable principle of California contract law is that a 
contract is void if it exculpates “the party from responsibility for its 
own fraud, or willful injury to the person or property of another.”70 
Discover Bank held that a class action waiver “found in a consumer 
contract of adhesion in a setting in which disputes between the 
contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages” is 
an unenforceable exculpatory provision in a suit alleging “that the 
party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to 
deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually 
small sums of money.”71 In that setting, the California Supreme Court 
reasoned that the class action waiver was not a procedural difference, 
permissible under Gilmer, but an invalid prospective waiver of 
substantive rights. In Gentry v. Superior Court,72 the California 
Supreme Court extended the Discover Bank rule to cases in which 
employees allege wage and hour law violations, reasoning that 
employment agreements are also contracts of adhesion drafted by the 
 
 65.  Id. at 26. 
 66.  Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1482 (D.C. Cir. 1997). 
 67.  Armendariz v. Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 694 (Cal. 2000). 
 68.  Hooters of America, Inc. v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999) (invalidating an 
arbitration agreement that imposed onerous procedures on the plaintiff but not the company, 
that allowed the company but not the plaintiff to choose eligible arbitrators, and that allowed 
the company but not the plaintiff to obtain judicial review). 
 69.  9 U.S.C.A. § 2 (West 2011); David S. Schwartz, Correcting Federalism Mistakes in 
Statutory Interpretation: The Supreme Court and the Federal Arbitration Act, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 52 (2004). 
 70.  Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005). 
 71.  Id.  
 72.  Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556 (Cal. 2007). 
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party with superior bargaining power, also involve a small amount of 
individual damages, and also involve a scheme by which the employer 
saves a great deal of money by cheating large numbers of employees 
out of small sums of unpaid overtime or minimum wages.73 
In other cases, the California Supreme Court has similarly found 
that particularly onerous terms in arbitration agreements drafted by 
employers or consumer product companies are unconscionable or 
invalid exculpatory clauses that waive substantive rights. In 
Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc.,74 the 
California Supreme Court held that terms in mandatory pre-dispute 
arbitration agreements are unenforceable for claims under the 
California Fair Employment and Housing Act if they limit damages 
normally available under the statute, fail to allow discovery adequate 
to arbitrate the claim, do not require a written decision of the 
arbitrator, limit judicial review sufficient to ensure that the arbitrator 
complied with the statute, or impose on employees costs unique to 
arbitration such that the employee would have to pay more to invoke 
statutory rights in arbitration than she would to invoke her rights in 
court.75 The California Supreme Court later extended the Armendariz 
rule to common-law claims of wrongful employment termination.76 
A. The Court’s New Rules for Class Action Waivers in Form Contracts 
The impact of AT&T on this body of law in California and other 
states is unclear. In AT&T, the Supreme Court, five to four, found that 
the FAA preempted the California law.77 Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion gave three reasons for preempting the prohibition on class 
arbitration waivers. “First, the switch from bilateral to class arbitration 
sacrifices the principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and 
makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate 
procedural morass.”78 Second, because “class arbitration requires 
procedural formality,”79 a class action is inconsistent with the whole 
concept of arbitration. “Third, class arbitration greatly increases risks 
to defendants.”80 The Court spoke of the “in terrorem” effect of class 
 
 73.  Id. 
 74.  6 P.3d 669 (Cal. 2000). 
 75.  Id. at 682, 684, 689. 
 76.  Little v. Auto Stiegler, Inc., 63 P.3d 979, 990 (Cal. 2003). 
 77.  AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1756 (2011). 
 78.  Id. at 1751. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 1752. 
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action suits that pressure corporations to settle even non-meritorious 
claims.81 This logic is faulty and its implications are problematic. 
The majority’s first two reasons suggest that the FAA preempts 
state laws regulating the process of arbitration in any way that 
increases the litigants’ procedural protections, at least up to the point 
at which an arbitration agreement so streamlines procedure as to alter 
substantive rights. The contention is that arbitration is informal and 
therefore that the FAA preempts a state law that requires any 
particular procedural protections. This statement is an argument from 
definition and, like all such arguments, is unpersuasive. What if the 
arbitration agreement provided that arbitrators must resolve a case 
by flipping a coin? What if the arbitration agreement eliminated 
pretrial discovery? Simply saying that arbitration is informal tells us 
nothing about why the FAA preempts state laws prohibiting excessive 
informality. What Justice Scalia failed to explain is how to draw the 
line between a streamlined procedure and a waiver of substantive 
rights. Given that the opinion never addressed the Discover Bank 
reasons for finding that class action waivers actually operate as 
exculpatory clauses in certain cases, the opinion offers no reasons for 
finding that the FAA preempts laws against class action waivers. 
The third rationale is the most logically unsatisfying and politically 
objectionable. First, its reasoning—that class arbitration waivers are 
necessary to protect innocent defendants82—is inconsistent with the 
first two rationales, which were all about the necessity to streamline 
procedure. The majority found prohibitions on class action waivers to 
be preempted precisely because arbitration fails to offer defendants 
sufficient procedural protections in conducting high-stakes class 
litigation: there is no interlocutory appeal of the arbitrator’s class 
certification, and there is insufficient judicial review of the arbitrator’s 
ultimate decision.83 As the Court candidly admitted, “[w]e find it hard 
to believe that defendants would bet the company with no effective 
means of review, and even harder to believe that Congress would 
have intended to allow state courts to force such a decision.”84 Yet the 
Court has no trouble in allowing defendants to force plaintiffs to 
sacrifice the protections of the federal rules of evidence,85 the right to 
 
 81.  Id. 
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 1747. 
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a trial by jury,86 the right to a hearing in a public tribunal, the right to 
proceed as a class, or the right to judicial review of arbitrator error.87 
Why is procedural informality acceptable when it forces the costs and 
risks of litigation on plaintiffs but not on defendants? Because of the 
bigness principle: the loss of an individual employee’s or consumer’s 
claim—a claim worth perhaps a few hundred or thousand dollars—is 
small potatoes (to the Court at least). But the loss of a class action is 
worth millions. To the Court, it is irrelevant that a thousand dollars to 
an individual may be a proportionally larger sum than ten million 
dollars to AT&T. 
Not only is the majority opinion inconsistent about procedural 
formality, it is also grossly one-sided. The Court could not have been 
more explicit that its goal was to protect corporations against 
consumers who wish to vindicate statutory or common-law claims for 
fraud or false advertising. Class arbitration is unacceptable because 
the process “increases risks to defendants,” inasmuch as the 
aggregated damages might constitute “a devastating loss” that would 
“pressure[]” them “into settling questionable claims.”88 This assertion 
of the need for federal preemption is outrageous as a statement of 
values and deeply troubling as an indication of the future trend in the 
law. Parties settle “questionable claims” all the time, sometimes to the 
defendant’s financial advantage and sometimes to the plaintiff’s. The 
whole point of arbitration agreements is to induce plaintiffs’ lawyers 
to decline to bring cases because the risks and costs of arbitration are 
greater for plaintiffs than the risks and costs of litigation when 
balanced against the prospect of a recovery. Giving up the benefits of 
a jury trial very likely causes plaintiffs’ lawyers to settle or abandon 
meritorious causes because the chance of a substantial recovery is 
greatly reduced; why should defendants force that choice on plaintiffs 
but not be subject to a rule that forces the risk of class action 
litigation on them? The whole purpose of the Discover Bank rule and 
its application in Gentry is to protect plaintiffs from corporations’ use 
of arbitration agreements as exculpatory agreements. The Court 
offered no reason, other than straightforward favoritism for large 
companies, why the FAA would preempt state laws intending to 
protect plaintiffs rather than defendants. The Court reads into the 
FAA a desire to avoid class-based remedies and a desire to protect 
 
 86.  Id. at 1748. 
 87.  Id. at 1752. 
 88.  Id. 
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businesses from class actions, neither of which is expressed or implied 
by the statute. 
B.  The Future of State Limits on Exculpatory Clauses in Arbitration 
Agreements 
The impact of AT&T on Gentry—or even on the continued 
viability of the Discover Bank rule—remains uncertain because of the 
particular facts of the case. The Concepcions’ adhesion agreement did 
contain a number of provisions to protect the consumer in arbitrating 
small claims. In rejecting the Concepcions’ arguments, the majority 
noted that the arbitration agreement was not likely to operate as a 
complete exculpation of AT&T.89 One question is whether this portion 
of the opinion is dicta or a limitation on the holding. The larger 
question is which other state laws restricting the enforceability of 
class action waivers and similarly onerous arbitration agreement 
terms are preempted. 
The arbitration agreement contained a number of procedural 
protections to enable consumers to arbitrate even small claims. First, 
it required the company to pay the costs of arbitrating nonfrivolous 
claims.90 Second, it required the arbitration to occur in the county in 
which the consumer was billed.91 Third, it denied the company the 
ability to recover attorney’s fees.92 And fourth, it provided that if the 
consumer received an award greater than AT&T’s last written 
settlement offer, AT&T must pay a minimum of $7,500 plus twice the 
plaintiff’s attorney’s fees.93 In rejecting the lower court’s and dissent’s 
concerns that denial of class arbitration in small claims operates as an 
exculpatory clause because no one will sue for thirty dollars, the 
Court pointed out that the $7,500 minimum recovery plus double fees 
provision provided an incentive for plaintiffs to bring small claims.94 
The majority overlooked the fact that the minimum recovery would 
apply only in some cases. On the other hand, the Court explicitly did 
not frame its holding as depending on this feature of the contract. 
Instead, in response to the assertion that class actions are necessary to 
prosecute small claims, the Court simply said, “States cannot require a 
procedure that is inconsistent with the FAA, even if it is desirable for 
 
 89.  Id. at 1753. 
 90.  Id. at 1744. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. 
 94.  Id. at 1753. 
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unrelated reasons.”95 It then went on the say that “[m]oreover, here 
the claim was most unlikely to go unresolved” because of the 
minimum recovery provision.96 Although the Court extolled the 
existence of these other procedures, never did the Court discuss 
whether they actually were used or how many arbitrations ever 
occurred under them. 
What the opinion left unresolved is the enforceability of an 
arbitration agreement that waives class actions and contains no 
minimum recovery provision in circumstances where the potential 
award is too small to enable individuals to arbitrate their claims. This 
is where the murkiness of AT&T causes trouble. The crux of the 
reasoning in Discover Bank and Gentry was that a class action waiver 
actually operates as an exculpatory provision where a class of 
plaintiffs suffers damages that are too small to make an individual suit 
feasible and where the defendant has an incentive to violate the law 
precisely because it knows that individuals will rarely, if ever, sue. 
Justice Scalia never directly addressed this analysis but did make 
three points about it. First, he dismissed the “predictably small” rule 
as “toothless and malleable,” noting that the Ninth Circuit held that 
$4,000 in damages met the standard.97 Yet the fact that the standard is 
malleable, and that reasonable minds can differ about the minimum 
amount necessary to enable a plaintiff to find a lawyer to take an 
individual claim, does not mean that most plaintiffs will be able to 
arbitrate individual small claims and that a class action waiver will not 
operate as an exculpatory clause. This is the logical fallacy of 
composition: the fact that some applications of the Discover Bank 
rule might be problematic does not mean that all are. 
Second, Justice Scalia observed that the AT&T contract provided 
a $7,500 minimum recovery plus double attorney’s fees if the plaintiffs 
recovered more than AT&T’s final settlement offer, which he 
believed would provide sufficient incentive for a lawyer to arbitrate 
the case individually and would make it “most unlikely” that any 
claims would go unresolved.98 Without this provision, claims likely 
would go unresolved, and the class action waiver would in fact 
operate as an exculpatory clause. But as noted above, it is unclear 
whether this fact is necessary to the holding. As presented by Justice 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 1750. 
 98.  Id. at 1753. 
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Scalia, this fact seems incidental, though it certainly provides a basis 
for lower courts to distinguish arbitration clauses in consumer or 
employment contracts that do not have such provisions. 
Third, Justice Scalia reasoned that the Discover Bank rule—that a 
class action waiver is unenforceable when the plaintiff alleges a 
scheme to cheat consumers—was not a limit on when a court could 
find an agreement invalid because “all that is required is an 
allegation.”99 The opinion never explained, however, why the 
perceived inadequacy of the limits in the Discover Bank rule means 
that it is preempted by the FAA. Implicitly, the majority seemed to 
think that in some cases the class action waiver would not operate as 
an exculpatory clause because some lawyers might be willing to 
arbitrate individual claims. But that conclusion rests on the same 
logical fallacy of composition: the fact that some lawyers might be 
willing to arbitrate some claims for $30 or $300 or $3,000 does not 
mean that many would or that enough would to enable individuals to 
enforce their legal rights. Data show that of seventy million AT&T 
customers subject to the arbitration agreement, only 200 have 
initiated arbitrations. As the Seventh Circuit said when invalidating a 
class action waiver, absent unusual circumstances, “only a lunatic or a 
fanatic” would litigate a case worth only a few hundred dollars.100 The 
overwhelming majority of lawyers are neither fanatics nor lunatics, 
and because AT&T presumably knew that when it included the class 
action waiver in its agreement, the class action waiver does operate as 
an exculpatory clause. 
Imagine that AT&T decided the fastest and cheapest way to 
process millions of small claims by disgruntled consumers was an in-
person, face-to-face meeting between the consumer and an AT&T 
claims manager. At such a meeting the consumer could present his 
claim and have it assessed and perhaps settled before either AT&T or 
the consumer went to the difficulty and expense of hiring a lawyer 
and initiating arbitration. Imagine, therefore, that AT&T’s lawyers 
drafted a mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreement requiring that 
arbitration be initiated by the plaintiff in person at the company’s 
headquarters. From AT&T’s standpoint, this is a legitimate cost-
saving measure that allows the fastest claim resolution. Consumers 
 
 99.  Id. at 1750. 
 100.  Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (“The realistic 
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a 
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”). 
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will, of course, find the requirement an insuperable barrier to 
presenting the claim any time that the travel costs exceed the likely 
recovery. If the likely recovery is small in most cases, under the 
Discover Bank rule, the in-person meeting requirement would be an 
invalid exculpatory provision. Would the FAA preempt Discover 
Bank on those facts? What if AT&T required claimants to do 150 one-
armed push-ups before initiating arbitration? Nothing in AT&T 
explains when or why the FAA preempts a state rule of general 
applicability—a prohibition on exculpatory provisions in contracts—
that prohibits arbitration agreements from imposing procedural 
requirements or restrictions that will have the predictable effect of 
discouraging some or most claimants from asserting a claim. 
Against that backdrop, consider whether the FAA preempts class 
action waivers in the context of a specific statutory remedial scheme 
that depends upon collective actions, such as those found in the 
federal Fair Labor Standards Act and state wage and hour laws.101 In 
Gentry, the California Supreme Court applied the Discover Bank rule 
to class action waivers contained in employment agreements that 
affected claims for unpaid overtime or minimum wage.102 Individual 
wage claims are typically relatively small; a claim for failure to pay the 
minimum wage could be as little as fifty cents an hour, which, over the 
two-year statute of limitations period, would add up to only $2,000 to 
$4,000 per worker.103 Many employees do not know what the wage 
laws require, or cannot find a lawyer to handle the case even when 
they know the company’s payroll practices are illegal. Moreover, 
 
 101.  See, e.g., Nicholson v. CPC Int’l, Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1989) (affirming 
refusal to compel the plaintiff employee to arbitrate his Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
claim because “the ADEA is one of the statutory schemes that present [an] inherent conflict 
with arbitration”), abrogated by Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
The court reasoned that Congress intended the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to 
eliminate discrimination by maintaining a collective action, something that arbitration could not 
effectively do. 
 102.  Gentry v. Superior Court, 165 P.3d 556, 563–64 (Cal. 2007). Under California law, 
“notwithstanding any agreement to work for a lesser wage, any employee receiving less than the 
legal minimum wage or the legal overtime compensation applicable to the employee is entitled 
to recover in a civil action the unpaid balance of the full amount of this minimum wage or 
overtime compensation, including interest thereon, reasonable attorney’s fees, and costs of 
suit.” Cal. Lab. Code § 1194(a). The federal Fair Labor Standards Act contains similar 
nonwaivable protections. 29 U.S.C.A. § 206 (West 2011). 
 103.  Gentry, 165 P.3d at 564. As the California Supreme Court observed in Gentry, citing 
data from the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement, the average award from the 
DLSE wage adjudication unit between 2000 and 2005 was $6,038. Id. According to another 2005 
report, the average wage claim submitted to DLSE ranged from $5,000 to $7,000, and the 
average settlement ranged from $400 to $1,600. Id. 
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these claims are difficult to prove because most employees do not 
keep records of the hours they worked over the course of several 
years.104 They thus have to rely on their own memory and occasionally 
confront employers who falsify payroll data to make it appear that 
the employees have worked fewer hours or been paid more than they 
have been.105 In addition, many employees will not sue their 
employers for unpaid wages for fear of retaliation.106 
Knowing that even small-dollar wage claims are important to low-
wage workers, that illegal payroll practices can produce big aggregate 
cost savings for employers, that bringing a wage payment suit can be 
expensive, and that without the threat of enforcement, scofflaw 
companies have strong incentives to violate the law, Congress and the 
California legislature provided that wage claims could be brought as 
class actions so that the hundreds of employees all subject to the same 
illegal practices could spread the litigation costs across their 
aggregated damages.107 Without the collective action procedure, 
individual workers would not easily find lawyers willing to handle 
complex, document-intensive, and often difficult to prove litigation 
with small potential recoveries, and companies would have little 
incentive to comply with wage laws. 
Relying on a declaration in a similar suit from the former chief 
counsel of the California Division of Labor Standards Enforcement 
(DLSE), the California Supreme Court also noted that forcing 
individual employees to present individual wage claims through the 
state agency’s administrative proceedings “would obviously be 
extremely inefficient as compared to a single class action” and “would 
simply outstrip the resources of the DLSE.”108 Between 2009 and 
2010, the division’s Bureau of Field Enforcement issued 3,534 
citations for labor law violations; its Economic Employment 
Enforcement Coalition issued 833.109 With a small staff of lawyers and 
investigators, even a relatively well-established agency like 
California’s DLSE cannot investigate, process, and prosecute the 
thousands of incidents of wage payment violations that occur every 
 
 104.  Id. 
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year.110 The number of federal wage inspectors declined by nearly a 
third between 1980 and 2007, even as the labor force grew by over 
fifty percent.111 Wage theft—the failure to pay earned wages—is a 
huge problem in certain segments of the economy.112 A 2008 national 
study of low-wage work in three major American cities found more 
than two-thirds of the 4,000 employees surveyed reported at least one 
wage payment violation in the previous week.113 
The class action is an integral part of the enforcement scheme 
under both state and federal wage and hour law. In an area of law 
beset by under enforcement, especially in low-wage sectors, to remove 
the class action would be to eliminate the only effective mechanism 
for effectuating these statutes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Justice Scalia’s opinions for the same five-Justice majority in Wal-
Mart and AT&T are premised on a frank hostility to class actions and 
an expressed desire to protect big business. As he stated, adopting the 
position urged in the amicus brief filed by the Chamber of 
Commerce,114 big class actions “greatly increase[] risks to 
defendants.”115 The size of a class action, of course, is a function of the 
size of the defendant. For big companies that are alleged to have 
violated the law in ways that affect their thousands or millions of 
employees or customers, the aggregate damages are very substantial. 
But big is not necessarily bad. Some critics fear that unscrupulous 
plaintiffs’ lawyers use class action suits as devices to extort a 
settlement that benefits class counsel but provides little benefit to 
individual class members. The solution to the problem of abuses of 
settlement class actions, however, is to increase scrutiny of the fairness 
of settlements rather than to impose huge barriers to class actions in 
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the first place. 
From the legal process perspective, the activism of these two 
decisions is stunning. In Wal-Mart, the Court interpreted a Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure to virtually eliminate employment 
discrimination class actions notwithstanding the lack of such an intent 
in the Rules or by Congress. In AT&T, the Court effectively ignored 
explicit language in the Federal Arbitration Act providing that 
arbitration clauses are not to be enforced where state law makes them 
unenforceable. 
The practical effect of these rulings is to protect corporations from 
class actions in both the employment and consumer contexts. The 
victors in these cases were Wal-Mart and AT&T, two of the largest 
corporations in the world. The losers were not just the women who 
work at Wal-Mart and the consumers who bought cell phone service 
from AT&T on the promise that the phones would be free. Ultimately, 
the losers will be those hurt in the future because big corporations 
know that they do not have to worry about class action suits if they 
impose a relatively small loss on a large number of people. 
 
